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ABSTRACT 
 
Fifty-nine CEOs from sectors across the country were sampled concerning their views on 
perceived uncertainty in seven environmental sectors and how it affects scanning behavior across 
the sectors. It was observed that the sectors in the task environment produced more strategic 
uncertainty than did sectors in the general environment. The results also showed that 
environmental scanning correlated positively with strategic uncertainty but that the frequency at 
which the environment is scanned varied across firms and industries and was CEO-specific. 
Moreover, when sector uncertainty was high, scanning involved a greater use of personal and 
external sources. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
he effects of the environment on business demonstrate the need to monitor events in the domain in 
which business operations occur. Scanning is thus critical for the survival and progress of a business, 
as it allows an organization to pick up environmental signals cohesively, respond proactively to 
threats, and learn about possible glitches and opportunities. Some organizations have therefore adopted a structured 
and vigorous approach to scanning their environment for vital signals, while others rely on their CEOs’ informal and 
ad hoc scanning behavior (Nystrom et al., 1996). The literature suggests that the complexity and volatility of the 
environment, coupled with the scarcity of its invaluable environmental resources, make scanning imperative. Daft 
and Weick (1984) describe scanning as the first stage in the strategic management process. It is taken for granted 
that the environment is a major source of uncertainty for managers who are responsible for identifying external 
opportunities and threats, implementing strategic changes, and achieving organizational/environmental alignment 
(Elenkov, 1997). How top managers perceive and interpret signals in their business domain therefore determines 
their strategic actions. As the uncertainty-scanning-performance relationship clearly bears significantly on strategic 
management, this line of inquiry has been of great interest to modern strategy scholars. Empirical investigations into 
the relationship among environmental scanning, business performance, and perceived uncertainty include Daft et al. 
(1988), Thomas et al. (1993), Elenkov (1997), May et al. (2000), Ebrahimi (2000), and Garg et al. (2003). However, 
no study has yet explored how CEOs in Africa perceive and respond to their environment.  
 
 Although Africa’s environmental conditions are highly unpredictable and unstable, many resources exist to 
help businesses survive. Africa’s environmental conditions require a proactive approach not only to domestic 
monitoring but also to keeping abreast with changing trends in the world economy, as domestic economies are very 
sensitive to shocks. The empirical works that have looked at the African setting include Sawyerr (1993), who 
conducts a comparative study on environmental scanning research in the Western context and relates it to the 
African context using CEOs’ scanning behaviors in Nigeria. We will contribute to this growing research by 
concentrating on Ghanaian firms. Most research has concentrated on CEO behavior within a single industry, 
specifically the manufacturing sector, making it very difficult to generalize the conclusions - what might pertain to 
one industry may not in another, as every industry has its own peculiar structure, conditions, and needs and may 
align differently to the environment. We contribute to the literature by examining scanning behavior in various 
sectors of the economy and exploring whether perceived uncertainty differs across industries; if it does, industrial 
T 
International Business & Economics Research Journal – December 2012 Volume 11, Number 12 
1412 http://www.cluteinstitute.com/  © 2012 The Clute Institute 
characteristics may play a role in general environmental scanning. We also inquire into how individual CEO 
characteristics impinge on the conduct of scanning in response to perceived strategic uncertainty. While previous 
works have focused on the direct relationship between environmental scanning and perceived uncertainty, this study 
looks not only at the direct linkage but at how it is affected by other characteristics relating to the firm, industry, and 
the CEO. We believe that, though these attributes may not be characteristically observed or compounded, their 
impact may be very significant. We find that strategic uncertainty positively correlates with environmental scanning 
but that the frequency at which the environment is scanned is stronger when such attributes as CEO and industrial 
characteristics are considered with other firm characteristics, such as firm size and business performance. The 
implication drawn is that firm size and improving performance increase strategic uncertainty, indicating the need for 
environmental scanning; how frequently the environment must be scanned across all media will vary across 
industries and CEOs, however. We also observe, based on the general contextual settings, that scanning patterns are 
all virtually the same, with personal and external sources used when sector uncertainty is high.  However, scanning 
frequencies can differ. 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 The environment exerts a strong influence on the strategic action of an organization. Duncan (1972) defines 
the environment as all the physio-social peripheries of an organization that are considered in management decision 
making, both directly and indirectly. According to Bourgeois (1980), cited in Daft et al., (1988), the factors with a 
direct influence on an organization’s operations constitute what is termed the task environment,1 while the factors 
that exercise an indirect control on transactions typically constitute what is called the general/remote environment.
2
 
Asheghian and Ebrahimi (1990), cited in Sawyerr (1993), suggest that the constitution of these two main layers of 
the business environment is not monotonously static but, rather, depends on how the organization’s boundaries are 
fixed and how its executives elect to explore those boundaries. Organizations function as open systems and hence 
need persistent interaction with their environments (Katz and Kahn, 1966; cited in Kemdirim, 1993). 
 
 What top managers’ face outside their business domain poses a constant quandary. Perceived 
environmental uncertainty arises out of deficient information about the business environment, which, though 
habitually challenging and volatile, is where opportunities and valued resources are exploited for business growth. 
The dilemma is this: within the same risk set that threatens the organization there may be hidden unimaginable 
inherent advantages that the business organization can exploit if policymakers are able to place the puzzle pieces in 
the appropriate locations. Kemdirim (1993) suggests that organizations’ adaptation to changing environments is 
driven by transformational leaders who appreciate the dynamic nature of the environment and institute the necessary 
strategic changes to their organizations in response to these volatile exterior conditions.  
 
 To do this, managers require a critical amount of access to relevant information in order to gauge their 
business returns against the risks and take informed strategic action based on the perceived environmental trends. 
The stark question for top managers is where to acquire this useful information. An uncertain environment strongly 
impacts the shape of an organization’s structure and processes; hence, knowledge of the environment is critical to an 
organization’s survival (Kemdirim, 1993). Decision-makers rarely lack information accessibility; the literature 
suggests that mangers have abundant environmental information (Hambrick, 1982). Galbraith (1977) defines 
environmental uncertainty as the relevant information gap between what has been obtained for work and what is 
actually needed for the work; it thus describes the degree of accuracy with which future environments can be 
predicted (Kemdirim, 1993). 
 
 To narrow this gap, managers are compelled to scan the environment and extract the information useful for 
decision making. Environmental scanning is thus the strategy an organization employs to cope with uncertainty and 
learn about relevant events and trends (Hambrick, 1981). It is the acquisition of information about events, trends, 
and relationships in an organization’s environment, knowledge that will help decision makers identify and 
                                                 
1 The task environment is composed of such sectors as competitors, customers, and factor suppliers (raw material suppliers, 
creditors, and trade unions). 
2 The general environment also comprises such sectors as technology and the socio-cultural, political/legal, and economic sectors 
(Sawyerr, 1993). 
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understand strategic threats and opportunities (El Sawy, 1985); thus, its acceptance is a vital point of departure in the 
strategic management process (Aguilar, 1967; Daft and Weick, 1984).The process of scanning and selecting relevant 
information does not itself create uncertainty; rather, the complex nature of the environment, coupled with the rate at 
which environmental conditions change, produces perceived environmental uncertainty. Complexity is the extent to 
which useful events exterior to the organization are heteromorphic and copious while also carrying implications for 
business progress. The difficulties begin when this complex environment is also extremely dynamic: if relevant 
events’ rate of change is high, external activities shift rapidly, making it difficult for decision makers to stay on top 
of the issues (Daft et al., 1988). Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) theorize that, when changes in relevant environmental 
events go unnoticed, decision makers fail to undertake the strategic adjustments they need to stay competitive, 
resulting in systematic errors made by top managers suffering a mismatch between their decision structure and 
environmental conditions. The result is a decline in business performance or, worse, a management crisis (see 
Andrew, 1971; Bourgeois, 1985; Thomas et al., 1993, Subramanian et al., 1993)  
 
 Top executives need to scan their environment and obtain information for strategic decisions, but their 
scanning behavior is not a direct response to perceived environmental uncertainty. What motivates scanning 
behavior is external events’ importance to business performance; unimportant information would hold little value or 
interest to managers. The extent to which a sector provides materials for the attainment of organizational goals 
determines its importance to the business. Indeed, information from important sectors can even provide strategic 
advantage to a firm (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Dutton and Freeman, 1984; Daft, 1986). For instance, in a highly 
important sector, external events are perceived to be directly linked to operations and performance. This implies that 
an organization that has a structured mechanism for obtaining constant information from such sectors or simply 
possesses information about the sector that the competition lacks, enjoys a virtual competitive edge over its 
compatriots. Hence, the combination of perceived uncertainty and sectorial importance delivers what is called in the 
literature strategic uncertainty. Strategic uncertainty signifies the absence of information about events and activities 
within environmental sectors where any occurrence can significantly impact the goals and operations of the 
business. Strategic uncertainty thus generates the need to conduct environmental scanning (Daft et al., 1988); 
perceived uncertainty alone does not ignite any special drive to fish for environmental facts. In principle, strategic 
uncertainty reflects the strategic value of environmental information to organizational performance (Elenkov, 1997). 
 
HYPOTHESES 
 
Environmental Sectors and Strategic Uncertainty 
 
 One of the empirical questions pursued by the environmental scanning research is which sectors of the 
environment generate greater strategic uncertainty. The literature suggests that the sectors of the direct (task) 
environment, given its immediate control of business operations, have more intricate systems and thus a higher rate 
of change than do those in the remote (general) environment. Hence, the task environment creates greater perceived 
strategic uncertainty than does the general environment (Daft et al., 1988; Pearce and Robinson, 1991; Thompson 
and Strickland, 1992). An investigation of this phenomenon within various contexts has proved the contrary, 
however: there is no significant difference between the perceived strategic uncertainties of the two main 
environmental layers (see Daft et al., 1988; Sawyerr, 1993; Elenkov, 1997; May et al., 2000). These empirical 
findings also reveal that the perceived strategic uncertainty of all environmental sectors is highly irregular, with 
mixed compositions in both the task and general sectors. Specifically, every contextual setting reflects a totally 
different sectoral ranking of highly strategic uncertainty, though the consumer sector is symptomatically seen as one 
of the most strategically uncertain sectors in all empirical studies. Most of these scanning studies have focused on 
the manufacturing sector, however, and generalizing them is thus problematic. We wish to maintain the earlier 
supposition that the task has greater strategic uncertainty than does the general or remote environment, but we will 
test this result across various industrial sectors, including the service, manufacturing, financial, construction, and 
ICT sectors.  
 
 The reason for our stance is that Ghana’s market conditions are highly skewed towards the consumption of 
foreign products and services, forcing its businesses to constantly struggle to keep up with the changing tastes of its 
clients while producing competitive products that can do well in a highly liberalized and open market.  
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 Additionally, what pertains to the resource sector has been seen to affect most domestic businesses. 
Repeated industrial strikes, an inadequate supply of raw materials, and a chronic energy crisis have influenced most 
businesses across the country. The energy crises between 1997 and 1998 and 2006 and 2007, coupled with an 
always-unstable power supply, have had devastating effects on the economy and on businesses, particularly in 
energy-sensitive sectors like mining and manufacturing. Anecdotal evidence suggests that lack of access to power 
and interruptions in the power supply have caused production bottlenecks for cement manufacturing, at least in the 
last quarter of 2006, resulting in increased retail prices (CEPA, 2007). An inadequate supply of raw materials has 
also hurt Ghanaian businesses. For instance, after its establishment in the 1970s, the textile sub-sector dominated the 
manufacturing sector, accounting for almost 27% of manufacturing labor employment and 60% of plant capacity 
(MOTI, 2004, cited in Quartey, 2006); by 1982, however, a shortage of foreign exchange with which to import raw 
materials forced the sub-sector to operate far below capacity. Consequently, most of the industries went out of 
business, and the situation deteriorated during the trade reforms of the structural adjustment program (Quartey, 
2006). The raw materials situation is severe for organizations relying on either local materials or foreign imports for 
production. Businesses have been hurt by the import of cheap substitutes from Western and East Asian countries and 
urban consumers’ preference for these cheap imports, against which the textile and poultry sub-sectors find it next to 
impossible to compete. These factors have caused business closures and underperformance across the country. We 
therefore expect that issues concerning the consumer/market, factor suppliers, and competitors will create more 
uncertainty for CEOs in Ghana than issues concerning the economic or political sectors, important though they may 
be. 
 
Hypothesis 1:  Sectors in the task environment create greater perceived strategic uncertainty for top executives 
than sectors in the general environment. 
 
Scanning Behavior and Strategic Uncertainty 
 
 Much of the scanning literature has investigated the impact of environmental factors on scanning behavior 
(see Daft et al., 1988; May et al., 2000; Elenkov, 2000; Ebrahimi, 2000). Significantly, these studies find that the 
frequency with which CEOs scanned the environment increased with the perceived uncertainty (“scanning 
frequency” here refers to the number of times policy makers receive information about sectors in the environment). 
Thus, the more important top managers perceive the sector to be (i.e., as something that provides useful information 
for decision making), the more managers will be inclined to scan the sector for information. 
 
 The current empirical interest in environmental scanning flows from the assumption that it results in growth 
and business performance (see Thomas et al., 1993; Garg et al., 2003). Newgren et al. (1984) find that scanning-
oriented firms perform significantly better than non-practicing firms, which Daft et al. (1988) explain through two 
logical scenarios. First, the positive relationship between performance and scanning could suggest that broader 
scanning provides a broader environmental perspective, thus increasing predictive accuracy and leading to the 
correct strategic action. Second, the higher firms move on the performance scale, the wider their scanning patterns 
become. Specifically, high performance firms may have optimized the use of their immediate environment and thus 
perceive new territories and markets into which to expand; low performing firms, however, concentrate their 
activities in small domains to first establish their niche in order to thrive in the market. This implies that, as firms 
grow, uncertainty also grows, requiring frequent and broad scanning. Indeed, the literature suggests a possible 
linkage between broader scanning and performance (see Dollinger, 1984): a cyclical relationship may exist among 
performance, size, uncertainty, and scanning. Intuitively, we also detect the possible impact on scanning patterns of 
industrial and CEO characteristics. We suggest that every industry has a unique set of risks and peculiar needs that 
may require particular scanning modes; moreover, the CEO’s peculiar attributes impinge on the environmental 
scanning pattern he will be inclined to use. In fact, Kemdirim (1993) suggests that a business’ responsiveness to 
changing trends depends on whether the CEO appreciates the dynamic nature of the environment; if he does, the 
manager will ensure that the necessary strategic changes are instituted within the organization in response to volatile 
exterior conditions. Hence, policymakers’ awareness of the strategic value of environmental information for 
organizational performance and operations is critical. We ask whether scanning patterns in response to strategic 
uncertainty differ across industries or CEOs and, if they do, how this affects the linkage between scanning frequency 
and perceived strategic uncertainty. We postulate that perceived uncertainty does have an influence on 
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environmental scanning but that this influence is strengthened by factors relating to the person doing the scanning, 
such as the firm characteristics, the nature of the business, and the attributes of the CEO.  
 
Hypothesis 2:  Perceived strategic uncertainty will correlate positively to scanning frequency. 
 
Hypothesis 2b:  Characteristics such as firm, industrial, and CEO characteristics do not affect scanning patterns but 
rather enhance scanning frequency. 
 
 Perhaps the most critical issue is the nature and form of data most relevant to CEOs’ environmental 
assessment. Daft and Weick (1984) suggest that the source of information (scanning mode) is dependent on the 
organization’s mode of interpretation; scanning information is obtained from both internal and external and from 
personal and written sources. The literature has largely confirmed the preponderance of personal sources, including 
face-to-face contact and telephonic media, over written sources (e.g., documents, income statements, reports, 
memos, newspapers) in environmental analyses. Written sources are beneficial, however, in the amount of 
information they carry. For instance, Tyler et al.(1989) indicate that highly (personal) and poorly (written) 
information-rich sources are both used less frequently under highly changing and unpredictable environmental 
conditions than under stable, predictable conditions and that poorly information-rich sources are used more 
frequently than highly rich sources under stable, predictable conditions. Others, like Daft and Lengel (1984), argue 
that personal sources are richer because they provide feedback and hence generate understanding when uncertainty 
is high. Personal information is therefore content-rich and allows top managers to interpret weak signals (Ansoff, 
1975 cited in Daft et al., 1988). When perceived uncertainty increases, business executives are expected to search 
for or rely upon information from external sources in their decision making.  
 
Hypothesis 3: There is a strong association between perceived strategic uncertainty and scanning from personal 
sources rather than written sources 
 
Hypothesis 3b: External sources of assessment are more useful for CEOs when perceived uncertainty increases 
than are internal sources. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Sample Selection and Data Collection Processes 
 
 A total of 59 CEOs from various industries were selected for the study in a process principally based on 
criteria used by Daft et al. (1988) and Sawyerr (1993). Sampling selection followed three criteria: the firm had to 
have a well-defined task environment, be autonomous—its strategic decisions based on environmental condition and 
not the policies of mother institutions, and have the structural and behavioral characteristics of a well-established 
entity with a firm size of no fewer than 20 employees. The second criterion forced the selection of only indigenous 
companies; to include institutions with some foreign investment, an annex was constructed in line with Sawyerr 
(1993), such that companies with at least 60% Ghanaian equity interest qualified for selection. 
 
 All the firms fitting these criteria were selected from Accra and Kumasi, where most of Ghana’s 
established organizations are situated. Data were collected through personal interviews with the CEOs of the 
selected organizations. The questionnaires were vigorously tested and revised through a series of interviews with 
business executives and fresh students pursuing the Commonwealth Executive MBA program at the Kwame 
Nkrumah University of Science and Technology, Ghana. 
 
 The final questionnaire comprised vivid explanations of the environmental sectors and concise questions on 
scanning behavior and patterns, from which responses were generated. It was observed during the pilot testing that 
the survey’s five-point Likert scale3 was an effective way to measure the responses about the perceived rates of 
change, importance, and complexity, confirming the reliability of the instrumentation used by Daft et al. (1988) and 
Sawyerr (1993), which was also used by May et al. (2000). 
                                                 
3 1 = low and 5 = high 
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Variable Measurement 
 
 The variables of interest were all measured using the calculations provided by Daft et al. (1988), since this 
format has featured in a number of environmental scanning surveys (see Sawyerr, 1993; Choo, 1993; Elenkov, 1997; 
May et al., 2000). 
 
 Perceived strategic uncertainty (PSU) was measured as the product of the strategic importance and 
combined effect of strategic variability (rate of change) and complexity. Thus, 
 
PSU = importance * (strategic variability + complexity) 
 
 After the perceived uncertainties were computed, PSU scores for both the task and general environments 
were averaged to obtain composite PSU scores for them. 
 
 These average scores were then assessed against the responses on scanning behavior to ascertain the 
empirical linkages. The variables of interest with respect to scanning behavior were scanning frequency and 
scanning mode. Scanning frequency, which measures the number of times CEOs retrieve information from sectors, 
was computed,
4
while the scanning mode was estimated using a five-point Likert scale
5
 (see Daft et al., 1988; May et 
al., 2000). 
 
 Other variables of prime interest include the nature of the business (industrial characteristics), CEO 
characteristics, organizational size, and performance. The number of employees was used as a proxy for firm size, 
and performance was proxied by return on assets (ROA). Following Daft et al., (1988), ROA was averaged over 
three years (from 2009 to 2011) to reduce data aberration. The CEO characteristics factor was proxied by 
educational level. These variables assist an investigation and understanding of the linkage between scanning 
behavior and strategic uncertainty much more than control variables. 
 
Data Analysis and Results 
 
 The means and standard deviation for each uncertainty and scanning variable were first calculated for each 
environmental sector; Scheffe’s multiple range test was then used to conduct a multiple comparison of the estimated 
group of means and thus determine the statistically significant differences in strategic uncertainty across sectors. 
Pearson’s correlation statistics between the major dependent and independent variables were then computed. Two 
estimation procedures were used: the first related scanning behavior and strategic uncertainty with no control 
variable, and the second established four different categories and estimated the linkages between the two variables 
and four control variables (organizational size, performance, CEO characteristics, and industrial characteristics) to 
discover the linkage between scanning behavior and perceived uncertainty and determine whether the empirical 
linkages are also influenced by other external factors. 
 
 A summary of the sector characteristics and scanning modes appears in Table 1. A Likert five-point scale 
was used to calculate the mean scores. The results show that the sectors in the task environment are more important, 
complex, and volatile than are the sectors in the general environment. Ranked among the highest strategic variable 
sectors are the customer, factor supplies, and competitor sectors, followed closely by the economic and 
technological sectors. Moreover, the perceived importance, variability, and complexity of the sectors in the task 
environment occasioned the concentration of scanning activities in these areas more than was the case in the general 
environment. Apart from the economic sector, the third most frequently scanned areas for written sources, the task 
environment was the most frequently scanned in all scanning modes. The economic sector was scanned more rapidly 
than was the competitor sector for written sources. Scanning on the economic sector was done through external 
sources more often than by internal sources. CEOs scan the competitor sector less frequently than the economic 
sector through written modes but more frequently through personal modes because (we believe) most of the 
information on the economic sector is received in the form of published reports (Daft et al., 1988). Moreover, 
                                                 
4 See Daft et al. (1988). 
5 The scanning mode was based on external, internal, personal, and written sources, using the Likert scale (1 = low and 5 = high). 
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companies obtain most of their information about other companies’ strategic activities through personal contacts or 
informants since it is very difficult, if not impossible, to obtain information about other competitors’ blueprints 
through written documents. Companies find clues about what their competitors are doing only through 
advertisements, public displays, and symposia. Third, personal contacts are most prevalent in the competitors sector 
because most CEOs take advantage of clubs, associations, and other industrial peer review meetings to share ideas. 
 
Table 1:  Means and Rankings of Environmental Characteristics and Scanning Behavior 
SECTOR Characteristicsa SCANNING Modeb 
 Importance Change Complexity Written 
External 
Written 
Internal 
Personal 
External 
Personal 
Internal 
 MN SD MN SD MN SD MN SD MN SD MN SD MN SD 
Task Environment               
Customer 4.54 .988 4.08 1.04 4.10 1.17 1.83 1.17 1.98 1.30 1.34 0.66 1.60 1.01 
Factor Suppliers 4.19 1.09 3.93 1.02 3.74 1.21 2.42 1.33 2.58 1.26 2.15 1.20 2.42 1.28 
Competitor 4.10 1.10 3.89 1.06 2.79 1.06 2.51 1.36 3.32 1.18 2.17 1.16 2.33 1.39 
General 
Environment 
              
Economic 3.98 0.96 3.86 0.99 4.03 1.03 2.49 1.18 2.63 1.17 2.37 1.11 2.51 1.14 
Technology 3.95 1.27 3.54 1.32 3.85 1.19 2.67 1.19 2.95 1.25 2.46 1.30 2.81 1.29 
Political 2.98 1.27 2.63 1.2 3.12 1.16 3.03 1.43 3.32 1.31 3.05 1.29 3.12 1.22 
Sociocultural 2.79 1.21 2.6 1.44 3.86 1.14 3.31 1.07 3.32 1.18 3.23 1.06 3.71 4.04 
a. 1 = low, 5 = high 
b. 5 = low, 1= high 
 
 Further examination was carried out to test the study’s hypotheses. The analysis of PSU scores revealed 
that the average PSU score for the task environment was significantly higher than that for the general sector (t = 
7.685; P = 0.000). This result confirms hypothesis 1, that the task environment generates much more strategic 
uncertainty than does the general environment. A further probe showed that when the environmental sectors were 
segregated into task and general sectors, the three sectors generating the most strategic uncertainty were all from the 
task environment. The Scheffe’s multiple range test, at a 5% significance level, further revealed that each sector 
presented a different level of strategic uncertainty to policymakers. Starting from the highest to the lowest, the sector 
strategic uncertainties were classified as customer, factor suppliers, competitor, economic, technological, political, 
and socio-cultural. 
 
 Table 2 shows that each environmental sector involves a statistically different level of strategic uncertainty 
for CEOs in Ghana. The question is how this perceived uncertainty affects scanning patterns and whether this 
impact is spawned or enhanced by other firms, industrial, and CEO characteristics. The answers required the testing 
of hypotheses 2 and 3, which posit a positive relationship between perceived strategic uncertainty and scanning 
frequency and a stronger correlation between strategic uncertainty and scanning for personal sources than for written 
sources.  
 
Table 2:  Rankings of Environmental Sectors with Strategic Uncertainty 
Sectors Strategic Uncertainty A. B. C. D. E. F. G. 
A. Customer 3.8  * * * * * * 
B. Factor suppliers 3.4   * * * * * 
C. Competitor  3.3    * * * * 
D. Economic  3.2     * * * 
E. Technology 3.1      * * 
F. Political/legal 1.8       * 
G. Socio-cultural 1.5        
Note: asterisks denote significant differences between sectors at a 5% significance level based on Scheffe’s multiple range tests. 
 
 Scores were also generated following Daft et al., 1988. 
 
 To test these hypotheses, we first estimated the correlation coefficient between scanning frequency and 
perceived uncertainty without any control variable to see the direct correlation between perceived uncertainty and 
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scanning patterns. We then imputed other control variables in a stepwise manner to gauge the effects of the external 
variables on the empirical linkage between perceived uncertainty and scanning frequency. The outcome was the 
specification of five different models in the formulation of the empirical relationship between strategic uncertainty 
and scanning frequency, as displayed in Table 3. 
 
Table 3:  Empirical Relationship between Perceived Uncertainty and Scanning Frequency 
Scanning Freq PSU_0 PSU_1 PSU_2 PSU_3 PSU_4 
All modes 0.253 0.276 0.284 0.365* 0.482** 
All personal 0.402** 0.437** 0.438** 0.445** 0.585*** 
All written 0.136 0.139 0.140 0.168 0.245 
All external 0.364* 0.369* 0.370* 0.389* 0.416**+ 
All internal 0.264 0.285 0.295 0.297 0.335* 
Note:  PSU_0 = no control variable in the relationship between PSU and scanning frequency 
           PSU_1 = estimating the relationship with size as the control variable 
           PSU_2 = estimating the relationship with size and performance as control variables 
           PSU_3 = estimating the relationship with size, performance, and CEO characteristics as control variables. 
           PSU_4 = estimating the relationship with size, performance, CEO and industrial characteristics as the control variables 
* 10% significance level; ** 5% significance level; *** 1% significance level 
+All external sources are significantly greater than all internal sources (P< 0.001) 
 
 We tested the hypotheses by computing a correlation statistic between PSU and scanning frequency for all 
scanning modes. Table 3 indicates a positive relationship between scanning frequency and perceived uncertainty; 
however, not all the correlation coefficients are significant across the table. Without controlling for any external 
variable, when strategic uncertainty increases, top executives are inclined to use more personal sources than written 
ones and more external modes than internal ones. Scanning in all modes increases as strategic uncertainty increases 
but is not significant. This scenario is repeated even when we control for firm characteristics using size and 
performance as predictors. The patterns are the same, but the frequency has increased. Performance and size are 
estimated as having a strong and positive relationship with strategic uncertainty. Correlation coefficients of 0.416 
(P<0.001) and 0.432 (P<0.001) were obtained between performance and uncertainty and size and uncertainty, 
respectively. Scanning frequency differs significantly across CEOs (r = 0.683, P = 0.000) and the nature of the 
business (r = 0.478; P = 0.000). The question that remains is how these statistical differences (regarding scanning 
across industries and CEOs) affect scanning frequency and patterns. Table 3 shows that, while scanning patterns 
remain unchanged from when we consider firm characteristics alone, the frequency with which scanning is done 
increases. For instance, scanning in all modes is significant when we consider the influence of industrial and CEO 
characteristics, confirming hypothesis 2b (that firm, industrial, and CEO characteristics do not affect scanning 
patterns but rather enhance the frequency of environmental assessments). Thus, using multiple sources for 
environmental scanning is not contingent on how chief executives perceive the environment but on other attributes 
specific to the 1) firm, 2) the firm’s industry, and 3) other characteristics associated to the CEOs (see PSU_4). Put 
differently, scanning patterns will remain virtually constant across a country’s contexts and conditions; the key 
difference is the frequency with which the environment is scanned - a frequency that will vary from firm to firm, 
industry to industry, and CEO to CEO. 
 
DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION 
 
 Businesses do not operate in outer space, but even there they would still need to consider the conditions 
within which they conducted their business; the external environment is an important factor in their survival. Thus, 
this study examined how top executives scan their environment to make strategic decisions. Our assumption was 
that environmental monitoring by chief executives is conducted not only as a result of increased perceived 
uncertainty, but also of other benign attributes perhaps specific to the firm, the industry, and the CEO. These benign 
attributes may not be analytically classified or appear conspicuous, but their influence on the linkage between 
perceived environmental uncertainty and environmental scanning is considerable. A total of 59 CEOs from various 
industries participated in a survey designed to discover whether the two main environmental layers (task and 
general) differ in their generation of strategic uncertainty, to examine whether scanning frequency correlates 
strongly and positively with strategic uncertainty, and to explore the patterns and modes by which the scanning is 
done. 
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 Our analysis shows that strategic uncertainty differed significantly across sectors, with customers, factor 
suppliers, and competitor sectors ranking highest (in descending order), above the economic, technological, 
political, and socio-cultural sectors. Thus, the task environment generated more strategic uncertainty than did the 
general environment. Furthermore, the perceived increases in strategic uncertainty resulted in a frequent scanning of 
the environment in every scanning mode for useful information. However, chief executives used more personal 
sources than impersonal ones and more external modes than internal ones when perceived uncertainty was 
aggravated. The greater preference for personal modes under increased uncertainty reflects the inability to acquire 
hard data when events are fluid and unclear (Weick, 1985 cited in Daft et al., 1988).  Written sources are used 
frequently in sectors where conditions are stable and predictable. Personal sources are richer and can provide 
feedback, generate understanding, and be used to interpret weak signals when uncertainty is high (Daft and Lengel, 
1986). 
 
 Concerning the alterability of scanning patterns in response to strategic uncertainty, scanning patterns did 
not change, but scanning frequency increased when we controlled for attributes specific to the firm, the industry, and 
the CEO. Thus, personal and external sources are more critical in CEOs’ environmental assessments than 
impersonal and internal modes. Strikingly, scanning in all modes through multiple sources under high uncertainty is 
frequent when these surrogate benign attributes are considered in the analysis, implying that scanning in multiple 
media is not contingent on perceived strategic uncertainty as such. Firm characteristics (organizational size and 
performance) do not alone guarantee this linkage; rather, the guarantee is provided by industry and CEO attributes.  
 
 Specifically, environmental scanning is positively related to perceived uncertainty, but the frequency with 
which the environment is scanned is not explained by uncertainty alone, but also by such factors as CEO 
characteristics, the nature of the business, and firm characteristics.  
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